"Kherson's thermal power plant was severely damaged by a Russian strike in late August. The damage is so severe that it could affect heat distribution this winter. Local authorities are urging residents to relocate to safer parts of Ukraine while working on alternative supplies".
"Russia is growing its production of ballistic missiles. Moscow is shifting funds to produce specific weapons, building capabilities that are hardest for Ukraine to intercept".
At first glance, these two news headlines may seem unrelated, but in reality they are connected: they can suggest a forecast for the winter of 2026-2027 and not only for frontline cities, where the situation is tense, but also for many cities across Ukraine, because ballistic missiles could make this possible.
According to Ukraine's military intelligence, Russia had around 130 ballistic missiles for its Iskander-M (9M723) systems as of early August 2026. However, in July alone, the Russian defence industry produced 65 more of these missiles, exceeding its planned monthly target of 60.
Russia can now produce more than 200 cruise and ballistic missiles every month across all major long-range systems.
Russia is estimated to have around 400 RM-48U missiles (a surface-to-surface adaptation of the S-400/S-300PM interceptor missiles) and is producing roughly 50 more each month. Moscow plans to manufacture more than 480 of them in 2026, more than twice the number planned for 2025.
Russia is building industrial capacity to sustain missile strikes, replenishing missiles faster than Ukraine can replenish interceptors.
Ukraine faced several crises simultaneously during the winter of 2025--2026.
With temperatures even lower than -15°C, people were without electricity and heat in their own apartments. Thousands of buildings were affected, while municipal workers worked around the clock to restore systems repeatedly damaged by Russian strikes.
This winter, the threat could extend to every system a city depends on:
Heat: thermal power plants, boiler houses and heating networks
Damage to thermal power plants can deprive entire neighbourhoods of heating during freezing temperatures. Unlike electricity, district heating systems are highly dependent on specific physical infrastructure and are difficult to replace quickly.
Electricity: power generation, substations, transformers and distribution networks
Damage to a major substation or transformer can cut electricity to large areas and disrupt other critical systems that depend on electricity - including water, heating, hospitals, communications and businesses.
Gas: gas distribution and compressor infrastructure
Gas is used directly by households, but also critical for heating and electricity generation. Damage to a key gas facility can therefore have consequences across several systems at once.
Water and wastewater: water intake, pumping, treatment and wastewater systems
Water systems require a stable electricity supply. If power or pumping infrastructure is damaged, residents can lose access to running water even when the water source itself has not been destroyed.
Wastewater systems are equally vulnerable: prolonged electricity outages can disrupt sewage treatment and create a secondary public-health crisis.
For Kyiv, the vulnerability is particularly significant because the capital and parts of the surrounding region depend on major centralised wastewater infrastructure, including the Bortnychi wastewater treatment complex.
Transport and logistics: railways, ports and distribution hubs
Cities need constant deliveries of fuel, food, medicines, spare parts and other essential goods. Damage to logistics infrastructure can make it harder to repair other damaged systems and keep cities supplied.
Food and everyday supplies: food warehouses, supermarkets, distribution centres and grain infrastructure
Russia has already attacked civilian commercial infrastructure, including Epicentr, Rozetka and food-related facilities. A strike on a large warehouse or distribution centre can disrupt supplies well beyond the immediate area of the attack.
The same applies to Ukraine's agricultural infrastructure, from grain elevators and storage facilities to rail transport and ports. Damage to one part of this chain can delay deliveries, destroy stored products and reduce the ability to move agricultural goods.
Nuclear safety: nuclear power plants and the infrastructure that keeps them safely supplied with electricity
Nuclear power plants require a stable external power supply even when they are not generating electricity. Damage to the grid or substations can and already has created additional safety risks for nuclear facilities. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant has already demonstrated how vulnerable nuclear infrastructure can become during war.
If attacks intensify, the consequences will extend beyond infrastructure: cities may face population outflows, pressure on housing, schools, hospitals, and significant economic losses.
Russia is increasing its missile production while Ukraine is running short of interceptors, however, European stocks of Patriot interceptors are also under severe pressure. This makes the ballistic threat a European security problem and requires a European response.
Since Putin cannot afford to lose, any failures force him to escalate rather than seek compromises. Russia must be compelled to pursue peace when it loses all options for success and finds itself in a dead end, which is possible through sustained and effective sanctions pressure.
Europe and Ukraine should take a joint path - creating a large joint programme to build autonomous industrial and military capabilities, focusing on a new paradigm of warfare: mass production of anti-drone and anti-ballistic missile systems, advanced sensors, and military communications tools.
This also means rethinking where and how defence capabilities are produced and stored: production, storage and logistics should be dispersed across Ukraine and, where possible, partly located in European countries. More on this in The War, Without Illusions - with Andriy Zagorodnyuk podcast by UkraineWorld.
Protecting Ukrainian cities this winter is important on many levels:
for the EU and NATO, this is an investment in their own security. It is also an opportunity to build a more resilient European defence-industrial system and, ultimately, a way to help stop the largest war on the European continent since World War II.
