New electoral campaign will bring renewed risks of political deadlock, historical and political ultimatums, and the transformation of financial and military assistance into bargaining chips in domestic electoral competition.
Even moderate governments, seeking to contain the rise of radical parties, are likely to place emphasis on national interests. As a result, Ukraine's actions will also depend on its ability to build pragmatic, issue-specific coalitions with individual European capitals amid increasingly transactional politics.
Following the victory of conservative candidate Karol Nawrocki, backed by the Law and Justice (PiS) party, in June 2025, Poland entered a period of deep political polarization. Nawrocki paralyzed the reform agenda of Donald Tusk's liberal government. By extensively using his presidential veto, Nawrocki has blocked key judicial and social reforms proposed by the governing coalition, forcing Tusk to carry out a major cabinet reshuffle in July 2025.
This domestic political confrontation has increasingly spilled over into relations with Ukraine. Throughout 2026, diplomatic ties between Kyiv and Warsaw entered a period of tension due to historical disputes surrounding the legacy of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). After a Ukrainian military unit was named in honor of UPA fighters, President Nawrocki took Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Poland's Order of the White Eagle away.
Domestic political rivalry has even affected military assistance. When Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz declassified the volume of military aid transferred to Ukraine between 2022 and 2026, Nawrocki's presidential office condemned the move as "highly irresponsible" given the ongoing activities of Russian intelligence services, accusing the government of attempting to distract public attention from internal coalition disputes.
The parliamentary elections scheduled for 2027 are likely to become a turning point. Should PiS regain control of the Sejm, Poland could shift toward systematically obstructing Ukraine's accession process within the European Union. In July 2026, PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński publicly called on party members to make opposition to Ukraine's EU membership an official pillar of the party's electoral platform.
President Nawrocki has also made his own conditions explicit that Poland will not support Ukraine's accession to either the EU or NATO until Kyiv grants unrestricted permission for the exhumation and proper burial of Polish victims of the Volhynia tragedy.
Regardless of which party governs Poland after 2027, any future administration will have to take these public sentiments into account, particularly following the historic electoral performance of the far-right Confederation alliance, whose presidential candidates Sławomir Mentzen and Grzegorz Braun together secured more than 21 percent of the vote in the first round of the 2025 presidential election.
In France, the greatest source of uncertainty lies in the 2027 presidential election. As incumbent President Emmanuel Macron is constitutionally barred from seeking a third consecutive term, the centrist camp has become increasingly fragmented, with former prime ministers Édouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal competing for leadership.
Against this backdrop, the right-wing National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN) has emerged as the frontrunner in public opinion, led by Jordan Bardella.
Bardella's rapid rise as the party's leading presidential contender was accelerated by the March 2025 ruling of the Paris Criminal Court, which sentenced RN leader Marine Le Pen to four years in prison (two suspended and two to be served under house arrest with electronic monitoring) and imposed an immediate five-year ban on holding elected office. Le Pen denied allegations that she had misused European Parliament funds, and her political future depended on the appeal heard by the Paris Court of Appeal on 7 July 2026.
The appellate court upheld Le Pen's conviction for the unlawful financing of party assistants with European Parliament funds between 2004 and 2016 and maintained the €100,000 fine. However, it substantially reduced the period during which she would be barred from seeking elected office. Since the ban had already taken effect in the spring of 2025, the shortened restriction makes it possible for Le Pen to run in the 2027 presidential election.
According to IFOP-Fiducial polling, the National Rally is projected to achieve unprecedented electoral support. Its presidential candidate could secure around 40 percent of the vote in the first round. Even if Le Pen ultimately chooses to endorse her successor, Jordan Bardella, the party is still expected to dominate the opening round with 35–37 percent of the vote.
Marine Le Pen condemns Russia's full-scale invasion and accepts the provision of humanitarian assistance to Kyiv, but she remains firmly opposed to Ukraine's accession to both the European Union and NATO. Moreover, Le Pen has repeatedly argued that, once the war ends, Europe should restore strategic relations with Russia.
One of her most far-reaching proposals is the withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated military command - following the precedent established by Charles de Gaulle in 1966 - while remaining a member of the Alliance itself. In her view, such a move would restore France's strategic autonomy and reduce its dependence on American military decision-making.
Under an RN administration, France would likely oppose additional EU financial assistance for Ukraine, including a second €45 billion European loan package, while also resisting tougher economic sanctions against Moscow on the grounds of protecting French businesses and national economic interests.
Italy is moving toward general elections, which must be held no later than December 2027, against the backdrop of a marked decline in public support for Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni's government. By July 2026, approval ratings had fallen to 39 percent, while public dissatisfaction had risen to 61 percent.
Meloni's principal challenge comes not from the fragmented centre-left opposition but from the radical right, represented by General Roberto Vannacci and his newly established political movement Futuro Nazionale ("National Future"), which has consistently polled above the five-percent electoral threshold.
Vannacci, a member of the Europe of Sovereign Nations group in the European Parliament alongside Germany's Alternative for Germany (AfD), accuses Meloni of excessive conformity toward Brussels and Washington and opposes continued military assistance to Ukraine.
In an effort to preserve its governing majority, Meloni's coalition has promoted electoral reform introducing a proportional electoral system with substantial seat bonuses for coalitions receiving more than 40 percent of the vote. The proposal would also make it significantly more difficult for new political parties to compete by requiring them to collect 500,000 signatures in order to register for elections.
These domestic political pressures have had a direct impact on Rome's position regarding support for Ukraine. During negotiations over the final declaration of the 2026 NATO Summit in Ankara, Italy insisted on removing references to 2027 as the deadline for military assistance under the proposed €70 billion support package. Rome argued that rigid long-term commitments could undermine the possibility of achieving a diplomatic settlement with Moscow at an earlier stage.
Italy also declined to participate in the European SAFE (Security Assistance and Force Enhancement) initiative, which envisioned €14.9 billion in loans for defence investments intended to compensate for a potential reduction of the U.S. military presence in Europe.
Instead, Meloni's government has prioritized expanding Italy's armed forces to 160,000 personnel by 2033 while allocating substantial resources to domestic security operations such as Strade Sicure ("Safe Streets"). These internal missions consume considerable military resources and reduce the Italian armed forces' readiness for high-intensity conventional warfare.
To minimize public criticism over rising defence expenditures, the government has also relied on strategic messaging. Newly procured AH-249 attack helicopters have been presented as reconnaissance and escort helicopters, while the aircraft carrier Trieste has been publicly described primarily as a platform for humanitarian missions rather than as a major military capability.
Across Northern and Western Europe, domestic political agendas are increasingly limiting the resources available for supporting Ukraine.
In Germany, following the collapse of Olaf Scholz's coalition government and the snap federal election on 23 February 2025, CDU leader Friedrich Merz became Chancellor on 6 May 2025, heading a coalition between the CDU/CSU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD).
One of Merz's first major initiatives was the reform of Germany's constitutional "debt brake", accompanied by the creation of a €500 billion special fund dedicated to modernizing infrastructure and strengthening the armed forces.
However Merz adopted a noticeably more cautious approach toward Ukraine than he had advocated while leading the opposition. His government has had to govern amid historically low public approval with 86 percent of Germans expressing dissatisfaction by the spring of 2026 and under sustained pressure from the Alternative for Germany (AfD), which secured 152 seats in the Bundestag.
These political realities have pushed Merz toward a stronger emphasis on domestic reforms. His government has abolished telephone-issued sick leave certificates, introduced mandatory medical documentation from the first day of illness, and approved €10 billion in tax relief aimed at stimulating Germany's slowing economy.
The United Kingdom has experienced a similarly pronounced shift toward domestic political priorities. On 22 June 2026, Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced his resignation after serving less than two years in office. His Labour government had suffered declining approval ratings, disappointing local election results, and political controversy surrounding the appointment of Peter Mandelson as Ambassador to the United States. Allegations regarding Mandelson's past associations with Jeffrey Epstein ultimately compelled Starmer to dismiss him in September 2025.
Labour's setbacks were compounded by defeats in parliamentary by-elections. The constituency of Runcorn and Helsby was won by Sarah Pochin of Nigel Farage's Reform UK, while the Greens captured Gorton and Denton for the first time in the constituency's history.
Former Greater Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham, who returned to Parliament through the Makerfield by-election in June 2026, is widely expected to succeed Starmer as both Labour leader and Prime Minister.
Although Burnham has pledged to maintain Britain's military and diplomatic support for Ukraine while continuing efforts to strengthen relations with the EU, his political platform centered on "Radical Economics" and the "No. 10 North" initiative prioritizes the redistribution of public investment toward the UK's poorer northern regions. Consequently, London's political focus is likely to shift increasingly from international affairs toward domestic economic development.
Over the coming years, European politics will increasingly be shaped not by the simple question of whether governments support Ukraine, but by a more complex balancing act confronting mainstream political parties.
Centrist governments will face two demands that many voters increasingly perceive as competing priorities.
On one hand, Russia's war requires larger defense budgets, sustained military assistance to Ukraine, and substantial investment in Europe's long-term security architecture.
On the other hand, slowing economic growth, demographic pressures, widening budget deficits, and growing public dissatisfaction are forcing governments to reduce public spending, reform welfare systems, and ask citizens to shoulder greater economic responsibility.
This constitutes the central political dilemma confronting Europe's mainstream parties. Unlike radical political movements, centrist governments cannot simply prioritize one objective at the expense of the other. Reducing support for Ukraine would undermine European security. Yet neglecting domestic socio-economic concerns risks further strengthening populist and anti-establishment forces.
Consequently, future support for Ukraine will depend on European governments' ability to persuade their own electorates that Ukraine's security is inseparable from their own national security.
Another important transformation is taking place within Europe's eurosceptic movements.
Whereas the first generation of eurosceptics advocated withdrawing from the European Union altogether, a newer generation increasingly prefers a different strategy. It stands for remaining inside the Union while steadily expanding the scope of national sovereignty.
The objective is no longer the dismantling of the European Union itself but the gradual weakening of its supranational capacity.
As a consequence, Europe faces not so much the risk of institutional collapse as the risk of institutional fragmentation. Member states are becoming more willing to demand country-specific exemptions, block decisions that conflict with domestic political priorities, and use the EU's consensus-based decision-making process as leverage in broader political negotiations.
For Ukraine, this means that the sanctions policy or financial assistance packages may be delayed by the domestic political calculations of individual governments. Ukraine will also need to cultivate bilateral partnerships with individual member states. Successful European integration will depend not only on meeting the formal accession criteria but also on Ukraine's ability to navigate the evolving political balance within Europe's own systems.
