The intensity of internal mobility in Ukraine over has acted as a catalyst for a formation of networked society. The mass displacement triggered by the 2014 invasion and accelerated by the 2022 full-scale war has effectively destroyed some regional stereotypes and artificial political polarization. Particularly this experience of direct contact and the accumulation of shared human capital is in the focus.
A core original concept in this transformation is the emergence of what Ihor Semyvolos, Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, described as a "network society",
where horizontal solidarity systematically proves to be more resilient and functional than traditional vertical state hierarchies. In this framework, IDPs act as primary "connectors" or "weavers" who transport professional competencies, management styles, and cultural practices from one region to another.
This mobility has created a multi-layered network consisting of archetypal patterns of historical solidarity, situational mobilization energy, and a burgeoning institutional network of NGOs and relocated businesses that maintain national agency between crises. This networked structure is particularly evident in the economic sphere, where the relocation of businesses from the East, where over 41% of entrepreneurs have moved, has brought new standards of service and innovation to Central and Western Ukraine, conducting a "soft modernization" of host communities.
To understand this transition, one must examine the three distinct levels of interaction of network society.
The first is the archetypal network, a cultural pattern of horizontal solidarity deeply rooted in historical experiences such as Cossack self-organization and various national liberation struggles. This level exists within the collective unconscious and cannot be artificially reformed; it can only be activated or blocked.
While it remains resilient against direct external attacks, it is inherently vulnerable to identity splits, a weakness historically exploited by hostile narratives seeking to divide Ukraine into "three sorts" of citizens. The massive internal movement and subsequent "encounter with the other" have effectively deconstructed these regional myths, with a social distance index of 3.1, a record low for a group previously subject to regional prejudices.
This shift is further solidified by the fact that national self-identification has surged from 76% in 2021 to an overwhelming 94% by 2023, indicating that the encounter with "otherness" across regional lines has led to a crystallization of a unified Ukrainian identity rather than a clash of subcultures. This internal cultural movement has effectively neutralized regional myths; for instance, IDPs in rural communities often report remarkably high levels of positive treatment, reaching 83.6%, which contradicts long-standing stereotypes about regional hostility.
Contrary to political myths of hostility, 71.3% of residents of the western part of Ukraine have a positive attitude, and an even higher 79.1% of IDPs feel a positive welcome. Negative sentiment is marginal at only 6.8%. The southern part of Ukraine shows the highest level of IDP satisfaction, with 83% of displaced persons reporting a positive feeling of acceptance. Even in regions closer to the front lines, like in the eastern part of Ukraine, positive perception remains high at 73.6%. Across all regions, negative attitudes are consistently low.
The second level is the situational network, represented by specific, reactive mobilizations such as those in 2004, 2014, and 2022. These networks function like a "launch vehicle," propelling immense social energy into orbit in response to injustice or existential threat. However, because mobilization energy is inherently unstable, these networks eventually lose momentum.
This creates a strategic opening for the state's "vertical" to employ a "wait-and-see" strategy, anticipating the inevitable demobilization of the public. Consequently, the third and most vital level is the institutional network, comprising the NGO sector, reformist circles within the state apparatus, and volunteer organizations that have professionalized into permanent structures.
This is the most vulnerable level because it lacks the cultural permanence of the archetype and the raw energy of a crisis, yet it is the only layer capable of maintaining national agency (subjectivity) between periods of mobilization. IDPs play a critical role here; by integrating into new communities and establishing IDP Councils or social enterprises, they build the very institutional fabric that prevents social energy from dissipating.
This systemic transformation reveals that the traditional "society vs. government" framework is flawed, as both sides are internally split between two competing coalitions.
The functional vertical consists of state actors interested in the capacity of the state as a tool, a logic that produced the unprecedented reform of the Ukrainian Army after 2014. Opposing it is the rent vertical, which is driven not by state-building but by maintaining privileged access to resources through opacity. Importantly, these two logics often coexist within the same institutions or individuals, depending on the specific incentives at play.
Because horizontal social cohesion (the trust between citizens) systematically exceeds vertical cohesion (trust in state institutions) across all regions, the real struggle is between a "Coalition of Public Good" and a "Coalition of Privileged Access"
. The former unites the Functional Vertical with the Network of Solidarity, while the latter unites the Rent Vertical with horizontal networks that thrive on corruption.
Within this hybrid conflict, the decade of mobility acts as the "glue" for the Coalition of Public Good. IDPs, having been stripped of their previous status and forced to build new ties from scratch, have a heightened interest in a functional, transparent state rather than the preservation of old rent-seeking networks. As they relocate businesses they bring new management cultures and standards of service that modernize host communities. This "social diffusion" ensures that a reformist in the state apparatus and a volunteer in a local community are part of the same coalition, regardless of their formal titles.
The goal is to shift the systemic incentives so that participating in the Coalition of Public Good becomes more advantageous than remaining in the coalition of privilege.
Internally displaced persons have become carriers of skills, norms, and expectations that bind regions together. It is important that this newly formed “network society” can be saved and that horizontal solidarity can be translated into durable governance structures.
